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RECOVERY FROM THE UNITED STATES UNDER
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
By LESLIE L. ANDERSON*
T HE immunity of the United States from general tort liability
has finally been waived by Congress in the enactment of the
Federal Tort Claims Act.1 Even many proponents of this sort of
legislation may not be pleased that the statute denies trial by jury
although government may have it when it sues the individual, or
that the statute reflects upon the legal profession by putting practi-
cal obstacles in the way of adequate representation of injured per-
sons by counsel, or with the manner in which it expresses the
hands of various government agencies for whom exceptions in the
law have been inserted. Passage of the Act, aside from these pro-
visions however, accompanies naturally the general public change of
attitude toward various immunities which the government has
long enjoyed.2 It comes as a far cry from the reactionary state-
*B.A., M.A.. University of Minnesota, L.L.B. Harvard. Member of thc
(Minneapolis) Minnesota bar. Formerly Major, J. A. G. D., and membcr
of the faculty of The Judge Advocate General's School at the University of
Michigan.
'60 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U. S. C. 921-946.
A general court of claims bill was passed by the 70th Congress. It failcd
of enactment because of a pocket-veto by President Coolidge. H. R. 9285,
70th Cong., 2nd Sess.; 70th Cong. Rec. 4836. The reason for the veto appar-
ently related to administrative features in that bill. McGuire, "Tort Claims
against the United States," 19 Geo. L. Jour. 133 (1931).
Articles favoring such legislation: By the author of this article, Tort and
Implied Contract Liability of the Federal Government, (1946) 30 Minn. L.
Rev. 133; Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, (1924-1925) 34 Yale
L. Jour. 1, 129, 229; Kefauver, The Challenge to Congress, (1945) 6 Fed. Bar
Jour. 325; Holtzoff, Tort Claims against the United States, (1939) 25 A. B. A.
Jour. 828; Peterson, Governmental Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota,
(1942) 26 Minn. L. Rev. 293, 480, 613, 700, 854; Pound, A Survey of Public
Interests, (1945) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 909. See Government Tort Liability; a
Symposium, (1942) 9 Law and Cont. Prob. 179.
Since passage of the Act, Aron, Federal Tort Claims Acts: Comments
and Questions for Practising Lawyers, (1947) 33 A. B. A. Jour. 226; Bor-
chard, Tort Claims Against Government: Municipal, State and Federal Lia-
bility, (1947) 33 A. B. A. Jour. 221; Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act,
(1947) 56 Yale L. Jour. 534; Karcher, The Right to Sue the United States
Under the Tort Claim Act, (1946) 69 N. J. L. Jour. 297; Morris, Tort
Claims Against the United States, (1946) 19 Ohio Bar 487,
2Alabama v. King and Boozer, (1941) 314 U. S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 86
L. Ed. 3; Graves v. New York, (1938) 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83
L. Ed. 1300; 53 Stat. 55 (1939), 5 U. S. C. 84a (taxation) ; Keifer &
Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, (1939) 306 U. S. 381, 59
Sup. Ct. 516, 83 L. Ed. 372 (government organizations) ; James v. Dravo
Construction Co., (1937) 302 U. S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155
(jurisdiction by state over federal government land owned within the state).
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ment of the liberal Mr. Justice Holmes that "a sovereign is ex-
empt from suit.., on the ... ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends."3
Congressional conservatism in waiving general tort immunity,
whereas Congress had long consented to suit against the United
States in contract, 4 was related in part to a zeal to control govern-
ment expenditures and the budget generally. Torts occur despite
legislation and are not so mathematically predictable in advance as
is the contract cost of any project for which Congress makes
provision. Yet such is the problem confronting privately-owned
insurance companies, and they survive. Actuaries have access to
data by which to prophesy government tort damage in the fiscal
year ahead. The ardency of Congress for budgetary control has
dwindled noticeably, moreover, during the periods of the depres-
sion and the war.
More than perhaps any other factor impelling agitation for
consent to suit in tort against the federal government has been the
growth of government business and in the number of employees
to conduct it. On every occasion in which government took over
a function previously performed by private industry, the possi-
bility of tort damage to the public remained as great while the right
to recover for it was taken away. It has been argued against gov-
ernmental tort liability that the tremendous increase in number of
government employees together with their widening variety of
functions makes it too unwieldy to control their actions and too
difficult to obtain proof as to their conduct to justify holding the
government for it. Such argument could be made by any large
corporation or insurance company for itself. Tort liability should
be one of the natural penalties for conducting one's self so as to
endanger others. In the case of a project for the general public
good, the burden for damage done can more easily and fairly be
borne by the many to be benefited by the project than if it were
left to lie wholly upon the shoulders of the innocent injured person.
The United States had consented to be sued in certain cate-
3Kawananakoa v. Polybank, (1907) 205 U. S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct.
526, 527, 51 L. Ed. 834, 836.
4Suit in contract could be brought in the United States Court of Claims as
early as 1855. The pertinent statute is now the Tucker Act, 36 Stat. 1136
(1911), 28 U. S. C. 250; and 36 Stat. 1093 (1911), 28 U. S. C. 41 (20). For
procedures under contracts with the United States, see Anderson, The
Disputes Article in Government Contracts, (1945) 44 Mich. L. Rev. 44.
For -a general discussion, Grismore, Contracts with the United States,
.(1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 749. Treatise, Shealey, The Law of Government
Contracts, (2nd ed. 1927).
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gories of tort cases prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act.5 Provi-
sion had also been made for administrative settlement in fields of
tort limited as to specified causes, amounts that could be paid, and
nature of the damage to be allowed.6 Administrative settlements
were referred to as gratuitous. The department was authorized,
but not obliged, to pay anything. It did pay within limitations as
a matter of grace. Such settlement had a public relations value
for the federal agency involved as well as providing a method for
accomplishing substantial justice to injured persons without undue
expense to the government for handling it. Outside the terms of
these statutes, recourse of injured persons could be to Congress
only.
This latter procedure sounds of political favoritism3. There is
5The government assumed tort liability to the same extent as private
owners would have been in the federal operation of railroads (luring World
War I. Federal Control Act, 40 Stat. 451 (1918) ; New York Ex rel. Rogers
v. Graves, (1936) 299 U. S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269, 81 L. Ed. 306. It has
consented to libel in personam in admiralty for damages caused by public
vessel of the United States or for services rendered to such public vessel.
Public Vessels Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 112 (1925), 46 U. S. C. 781. Suit may be
brought for infringement of patents by the government. 40 Stat. 705 (1910)
35 U. S. C. 68. As an example of provision by Congress for administrative
determination of tort claims as distinguished from judicial determination,
see Federal Employees Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 742 (1916). 5 U. S. C.
751 ; Dahn v. Davis, (1922) 258 U. S. 421, 42 Sup. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 696: and
cf. Panama R. Co. v. Strobel, (C.C.A. Canal Zone. 1922) 282 Fed. 52.
6A number of these are specifically listed in Sec. 424 of the Federal Tort
Claims Act.7
"Congressman KEFAUVER .... the ordinary injured claimant who
does not have political connections is likely not to get justice. It is a hap-
hazard method. We are using a forum which is not set up for the giving of
real consideration to the merits of private claims bills ...
"The CHAIRMAN. I have often been aggrieved when a claim, which
has had consideration by the House committee and by the House, came over
to the Senate and had consideration by the Senate Claims Committee, and
then came up under unanimous consent in the Senate, and a figure had been
arrived at that a man who was hit by a Government truck and had lost a
leg ... should have $2,500, but because some Senator, who was not a miiem-
ber of the committee, and only had an opportunity to read the report as the
calendar was being called thought the amount excessive--I have seen the
person in charge of the bill willing to reduce the amount by $1,000 in order
to obviate the single objection which would throw the bill over and perhaps
defeat it .... It seems to me obvious on the face of it the present procedure
is not the way to secure a judicial determination of the right of private
claimants.
"Congressman KEFAUVER. Senator LaFollette, at the conclusion of
the last Congress I saw this happen: A claim bill passed the House for
$5.000. I think it was a death case. The Senate allowed $500. The Congress-
man who had sponsored the bill in the House agreed to accept the reduced
amount of the Senate on the theory that the Congress was about to adjourn
and unless he got it through for $500 he feared he would not get anything.
Of course, that is not doing justice to a claimant.
"The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a case of our great Government
taking advantage of a widow who is suffering a real loss."-Hearings before
the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, March 13 to June 29.
1945, 67-69.
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evidence that practical requirements made such favoritism fre-
quently unavoidable; and it has been generally distasteful to per-
sons who believe that justice should be obtainable as a matter of
right. It suggests a lack of protection for one not acquainted with
his Congressman. Commendation must here be expressed to the
Committees on Claims of both Houses of Congress, however, for
the general regard for fairness which they attempted to show
in recommending allowance of claims in practically all cases where
files persuaded them that recovery against the United States would
have been obtained had it not been for the immunity against suit for
tort. Procedure before these committees required no personal ap-
pearance by injured persons. It included investigation by the execu-
tive department involved together with its recommendation as to
whether there was liability or not. The departmental report was
compared with statements from the claimant, and the conclusion
drawn therefrom.8 Determination of large numbers of ordinarily
small claims hardly seems a proper function, on the other hand,
for men chosen to legislate on national and world problems., The
Committees on Claims have accordingly been abolished by the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.10
This Act is divided into five titles. The Federal Tort Claims
Act is Title IV of it. Tort damage must generally be investigated
extensively enough now to prepare the government for trial. This
is a burden heavier than could reasonably have been borne in
connection with the large number of claims arising out of the
activities of the armed forces during World War II. the efficient
8
"Congressman KEFAUVER. As it works, the departments actually
pass on these claims. As the chairman has said, Members of Congress,
because of the stress of other matters, simply do not have time to give them
judicial consideration.
"So what happens is that a claims bill is sent to the department and if
the department is against it the chances are the claim bill is not passed, and
if the department is for it the claim bill is usually passed through both
Houses."-Ibid, 69.
9"Congressman VOORHIS. It is too obvious to require long exposi-
tion that the central function of any national legislature should be the devis-
ing of a national legislative program with all that that implies."-Ibid, 29.
"Senator TAYLOR. I am on the Claims Committee. As a new member,
it strikes me that it is absolutely a very poor proposition to ask Senators
to spend their time pouring over these claims . . . you are absolutely at a
loss if you have not gone through the case yourself.
"So I have found that I had to go through them personally when I wvas
supposed to be familiarizing myself with Dumbarton Oaks, Bretton Woods,
or-Manpower, and many other things. I find I have to spend hours pouring
through these claims."-Ibid, 218-219.
1060 Stat. 812 (1946).
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handling of which has been highly praised.' The practical needs
brought about by the new statute should properly call for an in-
crease within the government of trained legal personnel for the
handling of tort claims.
WHAT FEDERAL AGENCY INCLUDES
Recovery under the Act is based upon loss or damage of prop-
erty or personal injury or death caused by negligent or wrongful
conduct by any government employee acting within the scope of
his office or employment. An employee of the government includes
military or naval personnel and persons acting in behalf of a fed-
eral agency. The agency may be acting temporarily or permanently
in the government service and with or without compensation. Fed-
eral agency includes the executive departments and independent
establishments of the United States.
Under this statute, it also includes corporations whose primary
function is to act as, and while acting as, government instrumentali-
ties and agencies, whether or not they are authorized to sue in their
own names. Language of the statute does not require that such a
corporation be one which the government owns. Its conduct and
primary function, rather than a requirement that the corporation is
a creature of the government and is owned by it, determine govern-
mental responsibility. The statute expressly provides, however.
that federal agency shall not be construed to include a contractor
with the United States.
12
All government-owned corporations do appear to be included
within the statutory definition of a federal agency. The attempted
division, recognized in the field of municipal corporations between
proprietary and governmental functions, does not apply to the
federal government. 3 Whatever that government does constitu-
tionally is governmental and its corporations would seem at all
times, accordingly, to be acting as instrumentalities of the United
States and performing governmental functions. When such cor-
porations are expressly given power to sue and to be sued, this
"Drafting of pertinent legislation and the organization of the Army
claims service were under the charge of Ralph G. Boyd of Boston, then
Colonel and Chief of the Claims Division in the Office of The Judge Advo-
cate General of the Army. For a discussion of settlement of claims during
the war, Boyd, War Department Claims, (1945) 6 Fed. Bar Jour. 434;
Stewart, (1945) Claims by and Against the Government."
12Sec. 402 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Other refer-
ences to sections only will relate to sections in this Act.
13Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., (1941) 314 U. S. 95.
62 Sup. Ct. 1, 86 L. Ed. 65.
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power was certainly broad enough prior to the Tort Act to con-
stitute a consent by Congress that they be sued in tort.
Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation, on the other hand,
is a creature of Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the
Federal Home Loan Board, an unincorporated body, is progenitor
of federal savings and loan associations. Both of these parents were
creatures of Congress. None of the charters of the corporate chil-
dren specified authority to sue or be sued. Yet in Keifer & Keifer
v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation,14 the Supreme Court held
that at least the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation was
subject to be sued in contract, and suggested that probably it was
open to suit against it in tort. Question may be raised whether
such corporation brought into existence by a creature of Congress,
but not itself a direct offspring of Congress or of a general in-
corporation law, should be treated as acting at all times primarily
as an instrumentality or agency of the United States.
The Tort Act, in any event, takes away the right to sue a cor-
poration for tort if its primary function is to act as a government
instrumentality or agency, and if the wrongful conduct complained
of occurred while so acting. The suit must be against the United
States itself; or the agency has power to settle smaller claims by
the administrative process. The authority of the federal agency to
sue and be sued is not to be construed to authorize suits against
the agency which are cognizable under this statute. The remedy
against the United States by suit in tort so far as it does come un-
der this statute is exclusive. 5
BASIS OF LIABILITY
Mr. Justice Brandeis stated in Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkin.s' 6 that "except in matters governed by the Federal Con-
stitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State." Government contracts are made only
pursuant to the Constitution or to authority from Congress. They
are governed, accordingly, by federal law. A body of federal tort
law had developed prior to the Erie Railroad case, and the plaintiff
in that case hoped the federal law would be applied. That suit was
by an injured person against a privately-owned railroad company.
The Supreme Court held that the state law where the injury oc-
curred would determine recovery. Action against the federal gov-
'4(1938) 306 U. S. 381, 59 Sup. Ct. 516, 83 L. Ed. 784.
15Sec. 423.
16(1938) 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ernment for tortious conduct by its employees with government-
owned machines operated pursuant to an act of Congress would
seem to call for application of the same law, on the other hand,
that is applied in government contract cases.
As a matter of practical psychology, however, persons about to
be injured do not examine statutes in advance or even consider
whether an instrumentality about to do wrongful damage to them
is owned privately or by the governmeiit. There is something shock-
ing to them in being denied recovery by application of the federal
law when, contrary to the Erie Railroad case, the law of the situs
would have required that they be compensated had private persons
caused the injury. The administrative practice in handling gratui-
tous tort claims prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act was to con-
form customarily, although not universally, as it was practicable
to do so, to the law of the state where the damage occurred, ex-
cept where a federal statute or specific government policy con-
flicted with the lav of the situs.
One such federal government policy was that contributory
negligence always bars recovery. This was firmly intrenched in
government administrative practice even without such require-
ment being specifically set forth within the statutes under which
administrative settlement was made. The Military Claims Act,'
7
under which most claims were filed arising out of Army conduct
in the United States during World War II, did specifically pro-
vide that no claim should be allowed under it if damage, injury
or death was caused in any part by the negligence or wrongful act
of the claimant. Thus the position that contributory negligence
barred recovery could not be relaxed under the Military Claims Act
where the policy was set forth within the statute, even in states
adhering to doctrines of last clear chance and comparative negli-
gence. It was not relaxed in such states as a matter of established
practice tinder other federal statutes authorizing administrative
settlement.
The concept of contributory negligence in any small degree
as being some sacred bar to recovery from the federal government
has now been dissipated by the new Tort Act. The law of the state
where the damage or injury occurs will now determine whether
doctrines of last clear chance or comparative negligence might
not be applied. Recovery under the new statute is based upon
1757 Stat. 374 (1943), 31 U. S. C. 223b, as amended by sec. 4, Act of
May 29, 1945, Public Law 67-79th Congress, and by Act of June 28, 1946,
Public Law 466, 79th Congress. Army Regulation, A. R. 25-25, 29 May 1945.
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damage, loss, injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
conduct of any government employee under circumstances where
the United States, if it were a private person, would be liable in
accordance "with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."' 8
DAMAGES
The statute under which tort claims were administratively
settled by most departments of the government prior to the new
Tort legislation was the Negligence Act. 9 That statute gave au-
thority to the departments and independent establishmefts to deter-
mine claims not in excess of one thousand dollars. After such de-
termination, however, the department would certify its claims to
Congress, by practice through the Bureau of the Budget from
which they would find their way to the Appropriations Committee
of the House of Representatives, and Congress would then pro-
vide for final payment of the claims in a deficiency appropria-
tion statute. Damage compensable under the Negligence Act was
only that to private property caused by the negligence of a govern-
ment officer or employee. Personal injury or death claims could not
be handled administratively under this statute. If a government
truck should collide with another motor vehicle, the executive
department involved, if within the purview of the statute, could
determine the claim administratively; but if it ran over and
crippled a child for life, his recourse would be by private bill in
Congress to be sponsored by his Congressman.
The Military Claims Act, to illustrate a more liberal provi-
sion for damages, was enacted on July 3, 1943, giving authority
to the Secretary of War or his designee to finally settle claims
not in excess of one thousand dollars. It allows payment, not only for
damage to or loss or destruction of property, but for personal
injury or death as well. That Act contains no requirement that
such loss or injury be a result of wrongful conduct. It states only
that it must have been caused by War Department or Army per-
sonnel or be otherwise incident to noncombat activities of the
War Department or of the Army. Recovery for personal injury
or death as permitted by the statute is limited specifically to re-
imbursement for medical, hospital and burial expenses actually
incurred. It does not cover pain and suffering. This statute was a
long-forward step toward fair compensation to persons injured by
'.
8 Sec. 403 (a), 410 (a).
1942 Stat. 1066 (1922), 31 U. S. C. 215-217.
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the government; yet it came far from the rules the courts impose
when private tort feasors are involved.
The Federal Tort Claims Act, however, finally contains but
little limitation as to the kinds of tort damage for which compensa-
tion will be made other than that recovery may be for damage, loss,
injury or death in accordance with the law of the place of the
wrongful conduct. This broadly-stated rule for damages relates
both to claims administratively adjusted and to those on which
suit is brought in court. Punitive damages are expressly dis-
allowed. Costs may be had by the successful claimant the same as
if the United States were a private litigant, but may not include
attorney fees. The usual rule in tort actions prevails that tile
government shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment."
SUBROGATION CLAIMS
Assignment of a claim against the government before the claim
has been allowed and a warrant issued for its payment is pro-
hibited expressly by what is known as the Assignment of Claims
statute, -' still effective, but not to be confused with limited provi-
sions authorizing assignments in connection with financing govern-
ment contracts. An attorney, for instance, may represent a claim-
ant; but he may not proceed in his own name by reason of a claim
against the government assigned to him by an injured person. The
statute prohibiting assignment of such claims is for the sole benefit
of the United States, and under some conditions officers of the
government may waive its requirements.2' This statute has been
held not to apply to a change of ownership occurring by operation
of law. An executor of an estate or a trustee in bankruptcy, as
examples, may properly make claim in their own names in their
representative capacities.2
3
Subrogation, accordingly, has been regarded as outside the
limitations of the Assignment of Claims statute. Congress, even
so, has frowned upon it in tort cases. The Committees on Claims
maintained a rule, from which they seldom deviated, refusing to
compensate on subrogation claims. A casualty insurance coni-
20Sec. 403 (a), 410 (a).
2154 Stat. 1029 (1940), 31 U. S. C. 203.
-2Martin v. National Surety Co., (1937) 300 U. S. 588, 57 Sup. Ct.
531, 81 L. Ed. 822; California Bank v. United States F. & G. Co., (C.C.A.
9th, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 751. Cf. National Bank of Conmmierce v. l)ownic.
(1910) 218 U. S. 345, 54 L. Ed. 1065. See 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 186 (1888).
-3Western Pacific R. Co. v. United States, (1925) 268 U. S. 271, 45
L. Ed. 503; Price v. Forrest, (1899) 173 U. S. 410, 43 L. Ed. 749; Goodman
v. Niblack, (1880) 102 U. S. 556, 26 L. Ed. 229.
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pany,:for example, might make compensation to an insured for
damage done by a third person to his automobile. In the event the
third -person is a private individual, the company's procedure
thereafter is to proceed against him under the subrogation provi-
sions of.the insured's policy. If, on the other hand, the third per-
son is-the government, the insurance company was unable prior to
the Tort Act to recover its subrogation claim in Congress. The
usual reason.given for denial of such claims was that insurance
companies arie paid a premium for assuming risks while the gov-
ernment-is not, and that the one who undertakes the risk for profit
should be the one to bear the loss. The Congressional policy, how-
ever,. disregarded the 'fact that the government was the wrong-
doer.
In 1922, however, the Negligence Act, heretofore referred to,
became effective, authorizing any executive department or estab-
lishment to determine administratively property damage claims
not in excess of one thousand dollars caused by the negligent con-
duct of a government employee. Subrogation claims were not al-
lowed even administratively at first under this statute, although it
contained no express provision against such claims. The Attorney
General ruled in 1932, however, that such subrogation claims should
be allowed under the Negligence Act.
-2 4
The Military Claims Act was enacted subsequently and during
World War II, applicable only to the War Department, and giv-
ing authority to the Department to make administrative settle-
ment for property damage or personal injury or death within a
limited amount caused by Department personnel acting within
the scope of their employment or otherwise incident to noncombat
activity. This statute again made no specific mention of subroga-
tion claims: It was the apparent position of the Department that
such claims could be paid under the Act, but that it was desirable
not to be obliged to deal with more than one person with relation
to a single loss. Settlement under Army Regulations would be
only with the insured rather than with both insured and insurer.2
No inquiry would be made into the relative interests of the two.
The entire 'claim, including any portion thereof insured against
or even paid for already by the company, could be paid to the
insured. The subrogee could thereafter recover from him as it was
able.
The Committees on Claims in Congress, however, as to claims
2436 Op. Atty. Gen. 553 (1932).
25Par. 21, AR 25-25, 29 May 1945.
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submitted to Congress for special legislation, continued to inquire
as to losses against which claimants were insured. Neither the por-
tion of claims insured against nor subrogation claims were recog-
nized there as compensable. In short, claims insured against could
be paid in limited amounts by administrative determination. Such
claims outside the administrative statutes would not be paid by
Congress. Tort subrogation claims against the United States were
nuisances and frequently losses to the companies. They have clear-
ly benefited by the elimination of Congressional handling of most
tort claims and by the passage of the new Tort Act. It does not
mention subrogation or insurance. Subrogation claims or those
covered by insurance may now be settled administratively by all
the federal agencies and may be pressed against the government
by suit in tort. The companies, moreover, can now go back to
January 1, 1945, and recover against the government for such
claims as were not allowed prior to the Act .21
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTME1INT
Claims of one thousand dollars or less are authorized by the
Federal Tort Claims Act to be settled administratively by the
head of each federal agency, or his designee, acting on behalf of
the United States.2 7 The award so made is conclusive as against
the government, except for fraud." Acceptance of it by the claimant
is final as to him and constitutes a complete release of any claim
against either the government or the employee of the government
whose act or omission may have given rise to the claim. 21"
Should suit be instituted on a claim cognizable under the Act,
arbitration, compromise or settlement may be made by the Attor-
ney General with the approval of the court in which the suit is
pending. 0 The authority to arbitrate is substantially new in
matters involving governmental controversies, except that such
authority does appear in the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 as
to war contracts with the government3' An award made ad-
ministratively by a federal agency, or an arbitration award, coni-
promise or settlement by the Attorney General after suit is started,
is to be paid by the head of the agency involved out of appropria-
2 6Morris, Tort Claims Against the United States, (1946) 19 Ohio lar
487. 27Sec. 403 (a).28Sec. 403 (b).29Sec. 403 (d).
30Sec. 413.
3158 Stat. 649 (1944), 41 U. S. C. (1940), Supp. IV.
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tions made therefor32 The head of the agency is directed to report
annually to-Congress the claims the agency has paid, including the
name of every claimant, the amount claimed and the amount
awarded, together with a brief description of the claim.33 Osten-
sibly, the' General Accounting Office is relegated to determiining
that paymehts are made only as awarded and to discovery of fraud.
Its past procedures suggest, however, that it will also scrutinize
transactions and report to Congress abuses it may find.
TORT SUIT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
Jurisdiction over suits against the United States under the
Tort Act rests exclusively in the United States district courts
sitting without a jury.34 Action may be tried either in the district
Where the plaintiff resides or in that in which the act or omission
complained of occurred. The statute specifies no jurisdictional
amount to be involved. Claims may be sued upon regardless of
amount, including smaller claims in amounts which the federal
agencies are empowered to adjust administratively. Suit may not
be commenced upon a claim that has been presented to such an
agency until the agency has made final disposition of the claim.
To this limitation, there are two provisos. One is that a claimant
may withdraw his claim from administrative consideration upon
fifteen days written notice to the federal agency, and thereafter
commence action. The second proviso is that as to any claim ad-
mnistratively disposed of or withdrawn from administrative con-
sideration, an amount sued upon shall not be in excess of the
amount presented to the agency, unless the increased amount is
based upon newly discovered evidence or upon evidence of inter-
vening facts relating to the amount of the claim.23
Thus there are two strings to the bow. On the one, the federal
agency may deny a claim. On the other, the claimant has his second
shot by suit in the United States district court. Language of the
statute compels the further conclusion that the claimant need not
even resort to the administrative remedy, and that suit may be
brought directly. Whether opening the United States courts to
trial of tort suits in amounts not in excess of one thousand dollars
without first seeking administrative settlement will prove to be a
nuisance to the courts remains to be determined. Had it been
32Sec. 403 (c).33Sec. 404.
34Sec. 410 (a).
35Sec. 410 (b).
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necessary to prepare for trial the multitude of tort claims in such
amounts arising from the conduct of the armed forces during
World War II, and had the courts been obliged to entertain such
claims in litigation without at least an administrative buffer, the
burden might have been considerably to the public detriment. As
to larger claims, Congress has been hesitant to leave them to ad-
ministrative determination; and in justice they should be pre-
sented where determination can be made on the basis of legally-
recognizable right.
It may be noted that upon trial the administrative disposition of
a claim is not proper evidence of either liability or amount of
damages." This does not mean, however, that evidence filed with
the federal agency is not admissible; and this fact may deter the
making of claims for administrative disposition. Judgment after
trial is a complete bar to action on the same subject matter by the
claimant against the government employee who may wrongfully
have caused the injury or damage.3 7 Further rights by the govern-
ment itself against the employee after judgment so obtained are
not within the purview of this analysis.
As to procedure, the federal rules are followed. Provisions for
counterclaim and set-off and for interest upon judgments and pay-
inent of them as they are provided for within the Tucker Act are
extended to this statute.S The requirement within the statute that
the district court try the case without a jury has probably been a
consequence in part of a fear that juries are more open to passion
and prejudice than a judge. The requirement otherwise comes
naturally. however, in that the United States Court of Claims pro-
ceeds without a jury, and trial by judges is a procedure in suits
against the government to which the federal government is ac-
customed.
Appeal may be in one of two directions. It may be to the circuit
court of appeals as in the usual case of appeals from the district
courts. Or, by way of departure, appeal may be in these cases to
the Court of Claims. The appellee must consent in writing if the
latter direction is to be pursued, and the appeal must be taken
within three months after entry of judgment in the district court.89
There is a particular advantage to appealing in the Court of Claims;
36Sec. 410 (b).
37Sec. 410 (b).
• 
8Sec. 411; 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 28 U. S. C. 723b, 723c: 24 Stat. 505
(1887). 28 U. S. C. 250.
39Sec. 412.
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forth.at. Court is a specialized one, trying only cases against the
United States and accustomed to guarding interests of both parties
'when the government is involved.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The period of limitations for presenting or suing on any claim
is one. year after the claim shall have accrued or one year after the
enactment of this statute, it having been approved August 2, 1946.
If this period had no exception to it, a federal agency to which a
claim shall have been submitted could arbitrarily refuse to make
disposition of it until the period for bringing suit on the claim
shall have expired. An exception has been made, accordingly, as
tc claims not in excess of one thousand dollars presented to a fed-
eral agency within the allotted time, that the period within which
suit may be instituted shall be extended for six months from the
date the agency mails notice to the claimant as to final disposition
of the claim or from the date of withdrawal of it. To this exception,
there is a further requisite, that the period will not be so extended
in the event the time to sue had not otherwise expired at the time
of such administrative disposition or withdrawal of the claim.40
ExCEPrIONS IN THE AcT
Not all conduct ordinarily regarded as a tort as between private
litigants or otherwise giving rise to recovery under the statutes
authorizing administrative settlement is covered by this Tort Act.
Numerous exceptions appear within it, and one could well argue
that they show to too great an extent the influence upon Congress
of government departments or agencies which have been reluctant
to concede that certain conduct can be wrong or to relinquish full
control over disposition of tort claims. Various such claims give
rise to recovery under other statutes. Government employees, for
example, have rights against the United States under the new
Act, at least while not on duty, as extensive as those of any private
citizen. In the event the facts are such that an employee should
have rights under one of the Federal Employees' Compensation
Acts as well, it is probable that he may elect to proceed under
either- the Tort Act or a Compensation Act, but that if he once
elects to accept compensation under the latter he cannot there-
4oSec. 420.
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after recover under the Tort Act.41 Such claim thus seems to be
excepted from the purview of the Tort Act even though the excep-
tion is not expressly stated in it. Other exceptions are mentioned
specifically within the A ct.4
2
Congress, for instance, does not appear to consider the con-
duct of a government employee to be tortious when he exercises
due care in the execution of a federal statute or regulation, eveii
though the statute or regulation ultimately proves invalid. The
employee has at least performed the will of Congress enacted for
the general public good. Congress specifically excepts such con-
duct from the purview of this Act, and also excepts the performance
or failure to exercise a discretionary function or duty by a federal
agency or employee, even if the discretion be abused. These excep-
tions protect the government from liability tinder the Act, but they
do not purport to lend added protection to the agency or employee.
An example of the exceptions last mentioned arises in connec-
tion with taking or damaging of private property for a public pur-
pose and the protections to be afforded under the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. 3 If there is a taking by the government
pursuant to statute under such circumstances that a contractual
relationship can be made out between the government and him
whose property is taken, he can recover under the Tucker Act.
A more difficult problem arises when private property is only
damaged or the taking by the government has been done tortiously.
In event of damage, distinction must be made between the natural
harmful consequences of such a statute or regulation on certain
persons and the consequences that flow from negligent or other
wrongful execution of it. If the former, there will be no recovery,
at least under the Tort Act ; but if the latter, there may be recovery.
As to the wrongful taking, the Supreme Court has wavered from
time to time, but has usually stated that there may be no recovery
because the Tucker Act does not bring tort claims within its pur-
view. The Tucker Act gives jurisdiction to federal courts over
4
'Dahn v. Davis, (1921) 258 U. S. 421, 42 Sup. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 696. Yet
acceptance from a private employer of compensation under the Longshore-
man's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (44 Stat. 1424, as amended by
52 Stat. 1164, 33 U. S. C. 901-950) without the compulsion of an award of
compensation by a deputy commissioner was held not to preclude an injured
employee from electing thereafter to sue the United States as a third party
tort feasor. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, (1947) 67 S. Ct. 847.
42Sec. 421.
43For a general discussion of this subject as treated by the federal
courts, Anderson, Tort and Implied Contract Liability of the Federal Gov.
ernment, (1946) 30 Minn. L. Rev. 133.
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claims "founded upon the Constitution... or any law of Congress"
or "upon any contract ... with the Government . . . or for damn-
ages . . . in cases not sounding in tort." It is a hopeful sign that,
in this day of expanding governmental functions, Mr. Justice
Douglas has finally said for the present Supreme Court in United
States v. Causby:44
"We need not decide whether repeated trespasses might give
rise to an implied contract .... If there is a taking, the claim is
'founded upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims to hear and determine."
The Tort Act, moreover, specifically excepts from its purview
claims arising out of the loss, miscarriage or negligent transmis-
sion of mail. This surely does not mean that the government is not
liable for damage of property other than mail or injury caused by
the negligent handling of post office trucks. Mail claims have been
of a peculiar category in the administrative handling of claims
prior to this statute.45 They relate strictly to losses in the mails,
as to postal matter lost or spoiled in transit. The morale-building
factor of mail to the public has been highly regarded in American
life, and ordinary mail is handled at a remarkably inexpensive rate.
If this rate is to be maintained, the costs to the government of
handling it must be maintained as low as possible. Government
must be able to assume that most mail lacks more than nominal
value. If it has a special value, it should be to the interest of
senders to insure or register it or otherwise to pay an extra charge
for special treatment of it. The sender, in short, has ways of mak-
ing sure of its speedy or safe delivery. It would be impractical for
government otherwise to know what mail has special value, and
it is only fair that the sender asking special treatment pay slightly
extra for it. Moreover, a sender of an item of value would seem
himself contrilutorily at fault for sending such mail in the ordi-
nary course. From that angle alone he should not be able to re-
cover even if this exception were not written expressly into the
Act.
Admiralty claims against the United States may be pressed
under this Act only if they do not come within the terms of two
4466 Sup. Ct. 1062 (1946). But see Atchley v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
(N.D. Ala. 1947) 69 F. Supp. 952, in which improper judgment of govern-
ment officials in impounding water so that crops were destroyed by the re-
sulting flood was not considered an actionable wrong, no taking having
occurred, even though the Tennessee Valley Authority was empowered to sue
and be sued.
45E.g., par. 5, AR 25-25, 29 May 1945.
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other designated statutes. 46 Claims arising in foreign countries
could not practicably be handled in our own country and are ex-
cepted; but, as to damage or injury caused by military personnel in
foreign countries, such claims may be handled administratively
within the foreign theaters under the Military Claims Act and the
Foreign Claims Act.47
No nation makes a general policy of providing for payment of
claims arising from the direct impact of combat by military forces.
other than to its own government personnel. Congress, by like ac-
cord, naturally has made no provision for recovery on claims aris-
ing out of combatant activities of the armed forces during time of
war. The hands of the Treasury Department and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation are indicated in the exemption of the gov-
ernment from liability for conduct by law-enforcement officers as
to claims arising from assessment or collection of taxes or custom
duties or from any detention of personal property. Along the same
line, there is an exception of probably too great breadth of claims
arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresen-
tation, or interference with contract rights. Further exceptions in-
clude conduct by the government under the Trading with the
Enemy Act, damages from a governmental quarantine, damages
caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury Department, dani-
ages or injury of vessels, passengers and cargo in Canal Zone
waters, and claims arising from the activities of the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority. It is believed the fear that prompted various of these
exceptions overlooked the fact that courts are bound to recognize
various privileges in the government despite its waiver of immunity
from suit and to declare that fault exists on the part of claimants in
instances where no fault would have been declared to have existed
had a private tort feasor been defendant.
ATTORNEY TEES AND THEIR EFErCT ox REPRESIENTATION
Almost within the category of exceptions from the statute is
the provision in it limiting attorney fees.4" Such limitations in this
40Viz, Act of Mar. 9, 1920, 46 U. S. C. 741-752: Act of Mar. 3. 1925.
46 U. S. 781-790. Viz, Act of Mar. 9, 1920, 46 U. S. C. 741-752; Act of Mar.
3, 1925, 46 U. S. C. 781-790. The Public Vessels Act was held to provide
recovery against the United States for personal injuries negligently caused
by government to worker on a public vessel. Mr. Justice Reed suggested, how-
ever, that if the Act were held not to'provide a remedy for personal injuries,
the case would have been thrown under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Ameri-
can Stevedores. Inc. v. Porello, (1947) 67 S. Ct. 847.
•755 Stat. 880 (1942), 31 U. S. C. 224d, as amended.
48Sec. 422.
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Act are only cumulative to indicate the desirability for a review
by the bar associations with the proper committees in Congress
of fees to be allowed pursuant to statute. In the field of bank-
ruptcy, the restriction is simply that the legal charge to be allowed
by the court be reasonable, and it is proper that fees be controlled
by the courts with care to avoid recurrence of past scandals. The
standard of reasonableness gives opportunity to the court to con-
sider all the factors involved.
Handling of claims before the Veterans Administration, as a
different type of case, calls for sympathetic treatment by attorneys,
and nobody would fairly advocate that this should be a field in
which attorneys could expect especially to profit. However, the
limitation under the applicable statute of a charge of ten dollars
per claim49 for veterans would not ordinarily cover overhead.
Many veteran problems involve substantial sums of money, and
questions of such a nature that the veteran concerned needs good,
rather than simply inexpensive, counsel.50 The fact of being a
veteran, moreover, is not a necessary indication of poverty, and the
attorney to whom he confides is usually best able to determine
whether a reasonably fair charge can be made. Yet Veterans Ad-
ministration itself is ordinarily the protector of the ex-serviceman,
and his need for outside counsel is not ordinarily so great as when
he seeks counsel for other legal matters.
Again, prior to the Tort Act, Congress made a practice of limit-
ing fees to be paid attorneys for presenting claims to be allowed
by private bill to ten per cent of the amount finally appropriated.
One reason for this limitation had relation to the busy life of
Congressmen; and attorneys were not to be encouraged to take the
time of Congressional committees by personally pressing private
claims before them. Executive departments, moreover, had much
to say as to whether an appropriation would or would not be made.
Committees were not so dependent as the courts are now upon a
proper presentation of the law and facts by attorneys represent-
ing claimants.
The Federal Tort Claims Act, however, anticipates adequate
representation by counsel and the vigorous presentation of claim
against the government by him. It has been indicated heretofore
in this article that this Act now makes it necessary for the govern-
ment to investigate most claims extensively enough to prepare for
4949 Stat. 2032 (1936), 38 U. S. C. 102.
5Some discussion on this subject by the author in book review (1946)
32 Va. L. Rev. 692.
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trial. Nor is there expectation that the Department of Justice will
not throw its force against the allowance of many claims regard-
less of the cost to the government of doing so, or that it will not
appeal in any case where it disagrees with a decision of the court.
The need for thorough preparation by the claimant's counsel is apt
to be greater, in fact, because the government is involved. An
anomaly assuredly exists in the wise consent by Congress that the
United States be suable in tort and its about face at this point in
throwing obstacles in the way of the claimant to the best of legal
representation. First, the Act provides in effect that only con-
tingent fees may be paid attorneys regardless of the fact that an
appeal may be involved. Secondly, the allowance of fees paid by
the claimant may be made a part of the judgment, award or
settlement. Third, the statute states that the fee allowed must be
reasonable; yet it must not exceed ten per cent of an administra-
tive settlement or twenty per cent of a recovery in court. These
limitations are quite apt to accomplish exactly the opposite from
the objective of Congress which, according to the apparent inten-
tion, is the protection of claimants from the attorneys representing
them. Violation of these limitations constitutes a misdemeanor,
and the penalty is a fine not in excess of two thousand dollars or
imll)risonment for not more than one year, or both. The result is
apt to be that attorneys who will handle such cases will ordinarily
do so only when the case is clear.
SUPERSEDED STATUTES
Statutes authorizing administrative settlement of claims which
were in effect at the time of the enactment of the Tort Act are
repealed by it only to the extent that the subject matter covered
by the old statute is also covered in the new.r" The Negligence
Act, heretofore referred to, gave authority to determine claims ad-
ministratively for property damage negligently caused by the gov-
ernment not in excess of one thousand dollars. The new Tort Act
empowers the federal agencies to make exactly the same sort of
settlement, but on a more liberal basis. It would seem, therefore,
that the Negligence Act is wholly superseded.
The Military Claims Act. as a further examl)le. authorizes
settlement of claims for damage or injury even though not caused
by the negligent or wrongful conduct of a government employee
but which is incident to noncombat activities of the War Depart-
5, Sec. 424.
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ment or of the Army. It has no geographical limitation, and applies
in all countries, except as to inhabitants of such a foreign country in
which an accident or incident occurs under circumstances whereby
the inhabitants are covered by the Foreign Claims Act. Such claims
exceeding one thousand dollars may be processed within the War
Department but be reported under the Act to Congress for appro-
priation. None of these three categories of claims under the Mili-
tary Claims Act is covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act. To
that extent, the Military Claims Act does not appear to be super-
seded and continues in effect; and it also still applies to any claims
within its full purview that may have accrued prior to January 1,
1945.
As to private bills, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
provides that they shall not be received in either House of Con-
gress as to payment of any claim for which suit is authorized to be
instituted under the new Tort Act.5"
SUABILITY OF STATES
Commentaries upon the right to sue the federal government
ought properly not disregard reference to the prejudice to which
most states still cling against opening themselves to suit by per-
sons to whom actually they owe an obligation. Local governments
may be sued in many instances in tort. At the other extreme, the
federal government, which is the highest of our governments and
relates to all the American people, is now subject to tort suit. In
between, most states, for reasons quite unsatisfactory, insist upon
immunity as to almost all causes of action. Some trend is found by
way of a gradual waiver of immunity by some states from suit in
some cases, although not generally in tort, while brief is obviously
as strong for waiver in parallel cases arising within the same states
in which claimants may not yet be heard in court.
The federal government is now suable whether under the Con-
stitution or act of Congress, in tort or contract. Both New York
and Illinois have courts of claims with jurisdiction over suits in
5-Sec. 131.
"Congressman KEFAUVER. . . . The second reason a bill of this
sort has not been passed in the past is we fear that even after the claim has
been considered by the court, some Congressman, upon the behest of an
injured person, would still try to get a private claims bill through the
-Congress. That could be taken care of by providing in the law that this
would be his exclusive remedy and a claimant should be estopped or pre-
"cluded from asserting a claim in any other way except in a court establisheld
for the consideration of it."
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both tort and contract against those states.5 3 Minnesota, as an
example, consistent with the situation in various other states, has
waived immunity from suit in certain limited instances only. These
include suit on contracts for the construction or repair of state
trunk highways entered into by the commissioner of highways or
by his authority ;" suit to quiet title or foreclose mortgages or liens
on property, to obtain an adjudication touching any mortgage
or lien claimed by the state, and to determine boundary lines be-
tween state property and land contiguous thereto;5 and suit for
damages caused by the location, construction, reconstruction, im-
provement or maintenance of the trunk highway system."6 These
few categories under the Minnesota statutes include claims in
contract, tort, and to enforce a bit of a provision of the state
Constitution.
No satisfactory reason can be perceived for the waiver of ni-
munity against suit on highway contracts and not on other con-
tracts with the state. Why should suit be authorized for damage
caused by construction of state highways and not for damage
caused by all other state projects for the general public good ? Can
one detect consistency between consent to suit for damage to pri-
vate property in highway cases and the denial of such suit generally
in eminent domain cases not commenced by the state by way of con-
demnation proceedings? No justification appears why one may
sue for damage to his property in isolated cases, but no recourse iii
court as a matter of right is open to a child maimed and handi-
capped for life because of the wrongful conduct of a state employee
engaged in some project for the benefit of the people generally."
The correction of the existing evil within the states should be
by legislation opening themselves to suit the same as private per-
sons are, whether under their constitutions or acts of legislature,
in contract, express or implied, quasi contract, or in tort. Such
legislation recognizes justice to be a thing of right, a realistic
recognition of good morals in the relationship of state and citi-
zenry."8
5311linois: Smith-Hurd Illinois Ann. Stat., Chap. 37, Sec. 427-439. New
York: 15 Nichols-Cahill Ann. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Acts. 325. Amendment by
Laws of New York, 1942, Chap. 442.
5
4 Minn. Stat. 1945, Sec. 161.03, Subd. 17.
•5Minn. Stat. 1945, Sec. 582.13.
•rMinn. Laws of 1945, Chap. 612.
57"It is certainly not in accord with American democracy to permit the
state to take private property by other than legal means and then to defend
itself by a plea of nonsuability."-Gallagher, Henry M., C. J., in Benson v.
Bentley, (1943) 216 Minn. 146, 160, 12 N. W. (2d) 347, 355.
5a"If I were a member of the legislative branch of the govermnent con-
sidering the advisability of establishing a court of claims with tort jurisdic-
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CONCLUSION
The especial contribution of the Federal Tort Claims Act is,
not that it extends adequate enough protection to injured persons,
but that it has pierced through the ancient prejudice that there is
something inconsistent between the sovereignty of the government
and any right to sue the government for wrongs it has done and
which it ought in good morals to pay. It leaves behind the fiction
that the king can do no wrong, from which even most monarchies
of Europe have departed, and adopts what is more realistically
consistent with the concept of democracy. The Act increases to
some extent the securities which surround the life of the individual
and the enjoyment of his property. More remains to be accom-
plished.
Whenever substantial changes occur in the economic or social
or governmental life of the nation, it is probable that the courts and
legislative bodies will be obliged to go back later to tuck in odd
ends of injustice to conform society to the changes that have
occurred. This is a normal process of governmental and social
adjustment.
The wide expansion of activity by the federal government, for
instance, into fields formerly recognized to be functions of the
states and the rapid increase of federal employees made it neces-
sary to change long-standing rules and by a balancing process make
federal employees subject to state income taxationD and make
various transactions with the federal government taxable which
-were previously considered immune from state taxation." Had
this change not occurred, the federal government might have with-
drawn so much of persons and transactions and property from the
jurisdiction of the states to tax that operations of state govern-
ments could have been seriously crippled.
The federal government has taken over much land in the
various states. Jurisdiction over the federal reservations so ac-
tion upon existing tribunals as against the state, the reasons advanced by
the majority would be persuasive. Functions now performed by the state
seem to demand legislation of that character."-Loring, J. (now Chief Jus-
tice), in State v. Stanley, (1933) 188 Minn. 390, 395, 247 N. W. 509, 511.
59Graves v. New York, (1938) 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L. Ed.
927. 53 Stat. 55 (1939), 5 U. S. C. 84a.6o'We have recognized that the Constitution presupposes the continued
existence of the states functioning in co-ordination with the national govern-
ment ... And we have held that those burdens, save as Congress may act
to remove them, are to be regarded as the normal incidents of the operation
within the same territory of a dual system of government . . ."-Stone, C. J.,
in Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission, (1942) 318 U. S. 261. 270.
63 Sup. Ct 617, 621, 87 L. Ed. 748, 754. Alabama v. King & Boozer.
(1941) 314 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 43, 86 L. Ed. 3.
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quired is exclusively within the United States where the states
have given consent to the purchases. The result is that tremendous
amounts of land have been removed from the jurisdiction of the
states in which the land is situated, and states have lost control
for many purposes, including that of taxation, over the reserva-
tions and occurrences and persons within them. Dangers in this
regard became apparent; whereupon, the Supreme Court ruled
in recent years that states may consent to federal acquisitions with
limitations, reserving to themselves concurrent jurisdiction over
the property so acquired." A still further example is found in the
field of labor law where legislation, such as the National Labor
Relations and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, suddenly opened the way to
tremendous advancement for the cause of organized labor. Ex-
perience, however, has revealed some abuses that have occurred in
the transition. Congress has gone back to make the rough places
plain, giving serious consideration to means of eliminating the
abuses without harm to the major objective.
The vast extension in the sphere of governmental activity, both
state and federal, by like token, has resulted in much confiscation
and damage of private property and injury to persons, for which
adequate compensation has not been made. Protection to the indi-
vidual has not kept reasonably apace in the transition. Justice, as
this change occurs, becomes increasingly less a matter of right
within the courts and increasingly more a matter for personal
determination by governmental officers. There is some trend to-
ward correction of this evil. The federal government has led the
states, so far as providing recourse within the courts is concerned,
by supplementing the Tucker Act, long in effect, with the Tort
Claims portion of the new Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.
61
"The possible importance of reserving to the State jurisdiction for
local purposes which involve no interference with the performance of
governmental functions is becoming more and more clear as the activities
of the Government expand and large areas within States are acquired."-
Hughes, C. J., in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., (1937) 302 U. S. 134,
148, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 215, 82 L. Ed. 155, 166.
